package middleware
import (
"net"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
)
func AllowCIDRs(prefixes []netip.Prefix) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(host)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
ok := false
for _, p := range prefixes {
if p.Contains(addr) {
ok = true
break
}
}
if !ok {
http.Error(w, "forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
For internal admin endpoints, I often add a network allowlist in addition to auth. The tricky part is deciding which IP to trust: if you’re behind a proxy, you might need X-Forwarded-For, but only if the proxy is controlled by you. The middleware below parses CIDRs into netip.Prefix and checks whether the client address falls inside. I keep the allowlist immutable and fail closed: if the IP can’t be parsed, access is denied. In production, I also log denials with a request ID so you can debug misconfigured proxies without printing sensitive headers. The key is to treat this as a defense-in-depth layer, not your only protection.